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Abstract In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher
Bartel attempts to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. The
dilemma, formulated by Morgan Luck, goes as follows:
there is no principled distinction between virtual murder
and virtual pedophilia. So, we’ll have to give up either our
intuition that virtual murder is morally permissible—
seemingly leaving us over-moralizing our gameplay—or
our intuition that acts of virtual pedophilia are morally
troubling—seemingly leaving us under-moralizing our
game play. Bartel’s attempted resolution relies on estab-
lishing the following three theses: (1) virtual pedophilia is
child pornography, (2) the consumption of child pornog-
raphy is morally wrong, and (3) virtual murder is not
murder. Relying on Michael Rea’s definition of pornogra-
phy, I argue that we should reject thesis one, but since
Bartel’s moral argument in thesis two does not actually rely
thesis one that his resolution is not thereby undermined.
Still, even if we grant that there are adequate resources
internal to Bartel’s account to technically resolve the
gamer’s dilemma his reasoning is still unsatisfying. This is
so because Bartel follows Neil Levy in arguing that virtual
pedophilia is wrong because it harms women. While I grant
Levy’s account, I argue that this is the wrong kind of
reason to resolve the gamer’s dilemma because it is indi-
rect. What we want is to know what is wrong with virtual
child pornography itself. Finally, I suggest alternate moral
resources for resolving the gamer’s dilemma that are direct
in a way that Bartel’s resources are not.
Keywords Pornography  Video games  Ethics 
Gamer’s dilemma
Introduction
In an influential essay, Morgan Luck (2009) presents a
challenge to video game ethicists that he calls the gamer’s
dilemma. The dilemma begins with a common enough set
of intuitions: there is nothing particularly morally inter-
esting about gamers committing what I will call run-of-the-
mill virtual acts of murder, though there is something
morally repugnant about gamers committing virtual acts of
pedophilia. However, Luck argues, there appears to be no
sound moral basis for making this distinction—arguments
that we might give for the immorality of virtual pedophilia
turn out to be arguments for the immorality of virtual
murder. So, we are left with one of two options. Either we
give up our intuition that there is nothing morally wrong
with run-of-the-mill virtual acts of murder—which seems
to leave us over-moralizing our video game play—or we
give up our intuition that there is something distinctively
wrong with virtual pedophilia—which seems to leave us
under-moralizing our video game play.
In a recent and provocative essay, Christopher Bartel
points the way toward a potential resolution of Luck’s
dilemma. Bartel’s resolution relies on the following three
theses: (1) virtual pedophilia is child pornography, (2) the
consumption of child pornography is morally wrong, and
(3) virtual murder is not murder. Bartel’s resolution has
several things going for it. First, these three theses, if they
can sustain scrutiny, provide a principled moral distinction
between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Second,
thesis three is non-controversial. Third, the most contro-
versial thesis, thesis one, gains at least some plausibility
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from two thoughts: pornography is media inspecific, and
games with the kind of representational content described
by Bartel and Luck are clearly pornographic. Still, as some
readers will likely notice immediately, the truth of thesis
one lends an additional argumentative burden to the
seemingly non-controversial thesis two thereby rendering it
more controversial. This is so because it is not immediately
clear why virtual child pornography is immoral since, for
example, the production of such imagery does not directly
harm any actual children. However, Bartel defends of
thesis two by appeal to Levy’s (2002) argument that the
consumption and production of virtual child pornography is
wrong because it harms actual women and so his resolution
appears to meet the additional argumentative burden that
the truth of thesis one lends to thesis two.
Despite its apparent virtues, however, I argue here that
Bartel’s resolution to the gamer’s dilemma is inadequate for a
couple of reasons. First, in order to support thesis one—virtual
pedophilia is child pornography—Bartel points us to Michael
Rea’s (2001) definition of pornography. However, if we accept
Rea’s account, which I think we should, then only a very nar-
rowly circumscribed set of instances of virtual pedophilia will
so count. And, the limited recasting of thesis one that we are left
with is inadequate to resolve Luck’s dilemma. Still, I argue that
Bartel can avoid this worry altogether by recasting thesis two—
virtual child pornography is wrong—so as to not invoke the
concept of pornography, since, ultimately, the moral resources
that Bartel relies on, Levy’s argument that such imagery harms
women, does not require that such imagery be pornography.
It will be enough, on Levy’s account, if such imagery is plau-
sibly seen as sexualizing inequality. Still, I argue that even if
this recasting is successful in capturing the phenomena that
Bartel intends to capture, and I think that it is, the kind of moral
resources that Bartel appeals to in order to support thesis two are
in some important sense the wrong kind of reason to resolve this
particular dilemma. What we are looking for is something
distinctive about what I will sometimes call virtual child sexual
assault or, what Bartel and Luck call virtual pedophilia. Such
reasoning should make essential reference to the role that the
representation of children plays in marking it out as an actual
rather than a merely a virtual wrong. So, I conclude that we will
have to look elsewhere for moral resources that are adequate to
the challenge posed by the gamer’s dilemma. In closing,
I consider two such moral resources, both of which refer
essentially to the role that children play in such representations
and neither of which rely on ontological claims about
pornography.
Is virtual pedophilia child pornography?
To my mind, the most philosophically interesting and
controversial aspect of Bartel’s proposed solution to the
gamer’s dilemma is his claim that virtual pedophilia is
child pornography. This is an intriguing possibility that, as
I claimed earlier, gains plausibility from two thoughts.
First, pornography is media inspecific; it might occur in the
form of a written narrative, a painting, a photograph, a
moving image, or a cartoon, and similarly, it seems, a video
game. Second, it is clear that games that involve the gra-
phic depiction of sexual acts between adults and children
are pornographic. As Bartel puts the point, such imagery
certainly ‘‘sounds like child pornography.’’
Still, I think that we should be cautious here. As Lev-
inson (2005) and Mag Uidhir (2009) have pointed out,
there is a potential source of confusion in our thinking
about pornography: we use the adjectival forms of terms
for purposes other than indicating what something’s onto-
logical category is. To help see this point, let us consider an
example that Levinson provides: we might legitimately say
of a painting that it is photographic while consistently
denying that it is photography. Here the adjectival form of
the term is legitimate, while the noun/ontological form is
not. So, we cannot infer from the fact that the adjectival
form of a term legitimately applies to an object that its
noun form also legitimately applies. This leaves open the
possibility that we might rightly call an image porno-
graphic without thereby committing ourselves to the claim
that it is thereby pornography. So, the movie A Clockwork
Orange may be pornographic, but not pornography. The
same goes for Robert Mapplethorpe’s infamous Self Por-
trait (78).1 And, it seems, the same might be said of video
games, e.g., the notorious hot-coffee scene in Grand Theft
Auto is clearly pornographic, but is it pornography? In
order to answer this question, it seems that we will have to
know a bit more about the contours of the term
‘pornography’.
To be fair to Bartel, he does not intend to offer us a full
analysis of the term ‘pornography’ and hence does not
intend to provide a full defense of his resolution to the
gamer’s dilemma. Instead, he takes himself to be pointing
one way toward a resolution. To this end, he suggests that
we look to Micheal Rea’s definition of pornography.
According to Bartel, Rea holds that ‘‘objects can be
described as ‘pornography’ in two senses: if the object is
put to pornographic use, or if ‘it is reasonable to believe
that the object will be used as pornography by most of the
audience for which it was produced’’ (2012, p. 14). Bartel
goes on to claim that ‘‘it is not clear what it means to ‘treat
something pornographically,’’’ but that ‘‘taking enjoyment
in the depiction of sexual acts involving children for its
1 Maplethorpe produced many self-portraits. The one I have in mind
here is the infamous image of him taken from behind with a bull whip
inserted in his anus.
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own sake intuitively sounds like it should count as treating
such depictions pornographically’’ (2012, pp. 14–15).
However, Bartel’s reconstruction and subsequent
thoughts about Rea’s account are curious in several
respects. First, according to Bartel, on Rea’s view we
rightly say of an object that it is pornography if it ‘‘is put to
pornographic use.’’ But, Rea does not, and I think should
not, endorse this idea. Rea makes this point when he asks
us to consider the October 1996 issue of Life magazine
which featured a nude photograph of Marilyn Monroe.
Most of us, he claims, would consider the image pornog-
raphy had it appeared in Hustler and not Life. In light of
this, Rea claims, we might be tempted to say that
the difference is that in Hustler…but not in Life, the
picture would have been treated primarily as a source
of sexual arousal. But that can’t be the whole story. It
is a common joke that generations of American boys
have treated the Sears catalog and National Geo-
graphic primarily as sources of sexual arousal without
thereby making them pornographic. (2001, p. 118).
The lesson here is not that there are two ways in which
something can be pornography, viz., if it is treated pri-
marily as a source of sexual arousal and in some other, yet
unspecified, way. The lesson is that being treated primarily
as a source of sexual arousal—or what we might call being
treated as pornography—is all by itself insufficient for
something’s being pornography, though such treatment is
part of a more complete definition. This is an important
point to keep in mind, because if Rea has the right account,
then it shows us that we will have to know more than that
some gamers in fact treat such imagery as pornography.
We will have to know if such imagery meets Bartels’
second formulation of Rea’s account, that it is reasonable
‘‘to believe that the object will be used as pornography by
most of the audience for which it was produced.’’
Does virtual pedophilia meet this condition on being
pornography? Is it reasonable to believe that gamers will
treat it as such? Bartel claims that ‘‘it is not clear what it
means to treat something pornographically’’ but that intu-
itively he thinks that a gamer who enjoys video games that
depict virtual pedophilia for its own sake seems to meet
this condition. Rea, however, articulates a clear and
promising account of what it means to ‘treat something
pornographically.’ So, in order to see if Bartel’s claim that
virtual pedophilia is child pornography can be supported by
Rea’s account or not, I propose that we turn directly to
Rea’s definition of ‘pornography’.
X is treated as pornography by person S = DF (1) x is
a token of communicative material (picture, phone
call, performance, etc.), (2) S desires to be sexually
aroused or gratified by the communicative content of
x, (3) if S believes that the communicative content of
x is intended to foster intimacy between S and the
subject(s) of x, then this belief is not among S’s
reasons for attending to x’s content, (4) if S’s desire
to be sexually aroused or gratified by the communi-
cative content of x were no longer among S’s reasons
for attending to that content, S would have at most a
weak desire to attend to x.
x is pornography = DF it is reasonable to believe that
x will be used or treated as pornography by most of
the audience members for which it was produced
(2001, p. 120).
Here Rea presents us with a two-part definition. The first
part concerns what it means to treat something as por-
nography, and the second part concerns what it means for
something to be pornography, where something’s being
pornography—the second part of the definition—is para-
sitic on being treated as pornography—the first part of the
definition. One, but by no means the only, attractive feature
of Rea’s account is that being sexually explicit is taken
neither to be necessary nor to be sufficient for something’s
being pornography. This rightly allows that video surveil-
lance images of individuals having sex do not count as
pornography neither do manuals designed to help individ-
uals have more fulfilling sexual experiences. Each may
contain sexually explicit imagery, but neither seems to be
pornography. Further, it rightly allows that some kinds of
pornography may not be sexually explicit, e.g., pornogra-
phy of the foot-fetishist type.
Let us consider the first part first. Rea provides a
somewhat complicated, but I think clear and comprehen-
sive and account of ‘treating something as pornography.’
The question before us then is ‘‘does a gamer who enjoys
playing Bartel’s fictional game for its own sake treat it as
pornography?’’ For our purposes, I think that we can safely
set aside constraints one and three: video games meet
condition one and condition three is hardly ever (if at all)
relevant in video game contexts.2 Further, as I have argued
elsewhere (forthcoming, 2013), I think that condition four
should be rejected. What about Rea’s second condition?
Does our imaginary gamer meet this? For Rea, it depends
on whether or not the desire—in Bartel’s language, the
enjoyment—is sexual in nature.3 Our gamer would have to
desire to be ‘‘sexually aroused or gratified’’ by the repre-
sentational content, otherwise he would not treat it as
pornography he would treats it as something else. This,
2 The motivation for condition three is to rule out pornographic
images that lovers send to one another. These images, Rea thinks, are
pornographic but not strictly speaking pornography.
3 Obviously desire and enjoyment are not the same thing. However,
given that Bartel has invoked Rea’s account here, I take the liberty of
treating his account as Rea-friendly.
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however, is an altogether different notion than Bartel’s
notion of ‘‘enjoying a representation for its own sake’’ even
one whose content is of a sexually graphic nature. To help
see this point, consider that I might enjoy the representa-
tion of a sexually graphic scene in a movie for its own sake,
without having any sexual desires with respect to its rep-
resentational content at all. I might just think that it is very
well done. This would count as enjoying the representation
for its own sake, I think, but I doubt we would call my
interest in it pornographic precisely because my interest is
not sexual. Further, a gamer who enjoys a pedophilic video
game because what it represents is so shocking as to be
hilarious, enjoys the content for its own sake, because it is
funny, without having any sexual interest in the game at
all.4 What we will have to know about the gamer in
question is if his enjoyment is of a sexual nature. If it is,
then he meets the second constraint on using the game as
pornography; if it is not, then he does not meet this con-
straint. If this is right, then Bartel does not provide enough
detail about his fictional gamer for us to determine if he
treats the game as pornography or not. If we are to follow
Rea, and I think that we should, then merely finding out
that a gamer enjoys the game does not tell us what we need
to know.
Still, let us assume for the sake of argument that Bartel’s
gamers do as a matter of fact treat the game as pornography
in the primary sense that we have identified. That is, let us
assume that their enjoyment is sexual in nature. Should we
thereby conclude that the game is pornography? If we are
to follow Rea, even knowing this is not enough to deter-
mine if the game is pornography or not. According to Rea,
the question turns not on determining if some set of indi-
viduals treats it as such, remember the Sears catalog worry,
but instead if it ‘‘is reasonable to believe that [the game]
will be used or treated as pornography by most of the
audience members for which it was produced [italics
added].’’ Notice how strong this requirement is. If Rea is
right, then we will not be able to tell merely by attending to
the representational content (that it involves graphic sexual
content, even content that includes adults having sex with
children), or by merely attending to the fact that some
gamers treat it as pornography in the primary sense. We
will have to know something about who the intended
audience is and how we can expect that they will reason-
ably respond to the representational content.
How might we determine this? For one, we might look
to the company that developed the game for clues. For
example, finding out that a game was made by Mystique or
Illusion might count in favor of thinking that the game is
not just pornographic but pornography, just as finding out
that a pornographic image is in Hustler magazine would
count in favor of it being pornography. However, finding
out that the company is RockStar Games might make
things more difficult. Since they are known for making
games with shocking content, it is at least in the realm of
possibility that they would make a game intended to be
used as pornography. However, that they have not to my
knowledge developed such a game previously makes it
much less likely that their version of such a game would be
intended to be treated as such. We might further appeal to
supplementary information, like how the game is marketed,
to help make a determination. Is it advertised in porno-
graphic magazines or to ordinary gamers who are above the
age of consent? If this we are to accept something like
Rea’s account, and I think that Rea’s account is the best
one on offer, then we will have to know a lot more about a
particular game in order to properly assess its status as
pornography than Bartel’s recasting allows. What is clear is
that the mere fact that a game depicts acts of virtual
pedophilia or even invites gamers to enact virtual pedo-
philia combined with the fact that gamers (even a high
number of them) enjoy the representation for its own sake
is insufficient to make it pornography, even if it is enough
to ensure its status as pornographic.
Are pornographic images of virtual children harmful
in some way?
Having established that Rea’s account is inadequate to
support thesis one—the virtual pedophilia is child por-
nography—I propose that we set this issue to the side and
take up Bartel’s second thesis, that virtual child pornog-
raphy is wrong. Though I think that Rea’s account is the
best one on offer, I grant that it is at least possible that
Rea’s account will turn out to be flawed, and Bartel
expresses optimism that an adequate account will vindicate
his claim. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, I do not
think that Bartel’s argument for thesis two—virtual child
pornography is wrong—depends on making the ontological
case for its status as pornography. So, at the end of this
section, I will work to recast thesis two so that it does not
depend on making the case for thesis one. But, for the sake
of clarity and ease of exposition I begin by focusing on
Bartel’s claim, that child pornography including virtual
instances, are wrong rather than the claim that virtual acts
of child sexual assault are wrong.
To begin our inquiry, let me say a few things that I think
most parties to the debate will acknowledge. Producing
pornography that depicts actual children engaging in sexual
acts is generally wrong at least in part because of the harm
that is inflicted on the children that are depicted in such
4 I don’t mean to suggest here that either type of gamer escapes moral
criticism. My only claim here is that such gamers do not put the game
to pornographic use.
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imagery. Further, to the extent that the consumption of
child pornography contributes to such activities—without
the market for child pornography it would cease to exist—
it too is obviously wrong because it indirectly harms
children. This is also true even if we decide that for a
particular individual it is better all-things-considered to
consume child pornography, if, for example, it will overall
reduce the number of children that are harmed by sexual
predators. An argumentative challenge emerges, however,
when the pornographic image is virtual and not actual since
no actual children are harmed in the production of the
images, and it is not immediately obvious how the con-
sumption of virtual child pornography harms actual
children.5
In answer to the challenge posed by virtual child por-
nography, Bartel points us in the direction of Levy’s (2002)
essay in which Levy links virtual child pornography with
the wrongness of mainstream pornography, virtual or not,
namely that it harms women. According to Levy, this is so
because such imagery sexualizes inequality, specifically it
sexualizes that unequal relationship that occurs between an
adult and a child. Moreover, Levy argues, imagery that
sexualizes unequal relationships harms women. This is so
because it is deployed in a cultural climate in which
women are systematically treated as unequal, and this
inequality is achieved in large part by treating women as
sexually unequal, say by treating them as for the sexual
delectation of men. This conception of women, as entities
who are for the sexual delectation of men, operates as a
mechanism to undermine women’s autonomy and con-
tributes to their oppression. That is, it harms women. So,
Levy reasons and Bartel agrees, any imagery that sexual-
izes inequality more generally will contribute to the larger
cultural assumption that inequality is sexy and so is as
things should be. Virtual child pornography does this, so it
contributes, however, strongly, to the oppression of women
and hence harms women. It is for this reason, that it harms
women, that virtual child pornography is wrong.
Though Bartell calls Levy’s reasoning ‘‘surprising,’’ I’m
not sure that it should be since women and children have
much higher incidences of sexual assault than adult men,6
and women find themselves in much higher numbers the
subject of inegalitarian sexualized imagery, both pornog-
raphy and erotic imagery.7 Moreover, women’s oppression
is also often achieved by treating them as less than fully
adult. So, it seems natural to think that this kind of imagery
contributes to the general climate of sexualizing inequality,
and so harms women, however, strongly. In the case of
sexualized images of women—be they pornography, por-
nographic, or merely erotic—the case for harm, though not
uncontroversial, comes relatively easily. Since such images
are deployed in a cultural context where women are
oppressed and this oppression is achieved in part through
sexualizing them in way that makes them appear sexy
because unequal, any image that sexualizes inequality can
reasonably be seen to contribute to the cultural climate and
hence to hurt women. However, in the case of children we
do not have a similar cultural story to tell. On the whole,
children are not systematically oppressed qua children,
even if some children do experience systematic sexual
abuse and even if female children are oppressed qua
female. Further, children are not generally subjected to
representations that sexualize them; in fact, it is quite the
opposite. In the United States, for example, we have very
little cultural tolerance for images of children that are
sexualized8—this is what makes images of very young
female children who participate in beauty pageants so
controversial in the United States at least. Let me be clear
here. I am not saying that this does not happen to individual
children, it does. What I am saying is that children in
general are not harmed in this way because in general we
have very little tolerance for such treatment. In contrast, we
seem to have quite a bit of tolerance for sexualizing women
in ways that contribute to their oppression. Children, as a
class, are not oppressed in this way; women, as a class, are
(which, again, includes female children). It is for this
reason, that it is very difficult to make the case that virtual
sexualized images of children harm actual children in a
way that would parallel the case that Levy makes about
women. Of course, individual virtual images might con-
tribute to the harm of individual children. But, it is highly
unlikely that even a gamer that treats a Bartel-style game as
pornography, i.e., he is sexually aroused by the activity,
5 Still, the thought that such imagery harms children indirectly does
have some support in public policy. In the United States, for example,
the PROTECT Act of 2003 makes such virtual imagery illegal, and
those charged with defending this aspect of the protect act have
appealed to the harm that such images bring to actual children.
6 A comprehensive study on child sexual assault in the United States
conducted by the Department of Justice found that 285,400 children
ages 17 and younger experienced a sexual assault in 1999, which
amounts to about 4.1 children in 1,000. Of those victims, 89 % were
female and 95 % of the perpetrators were male, see https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/214383.pdf. Accessed 25 September 2012.
Further, a recent study on sexual assault, again in the United States,
found that an estimated 1 in 5 women is sexually assaulted in her
Footnote 6 continued
lifetime, see The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence
Survey (2011): http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs/. Acces-
sed 25 September 2012.
7 For a helpful discussion of the distinction between erotic imagery
and pornographic imagery, see Jerrold Levinson’s ‘Erotic Art and
Pornographic Pictures’ in Philosophy and Literature. 29 (1), 228–240.
8 While in the United States, there is likely too much intolerance for
child nudity, what is likely to survive cross-cultural scrutiny is a
general intolerance for the sexualizing of children. Where we will are
likely to have cross-cultural difference is in what kinds of activities
count as sexualizing.
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harms actual children in so doing. In fact, as is often
pointed out, one might even be able to make a compelling
case for the opposite claim, viz., no children are harmed in
the production of such imagery, children in general are not
oppressed by such mechanisms, and such activity makes
the gamer less likely to harm actual children. So, if making
the moral case relies on making the case for harm, then it
seems more promising to rely on a more remote harm,
namely the harm to women.9
In this section thus far, I have focused on virtual child
pornography, leaving to the side my concerns that many
games that Bartel would want to count as child pornogra-
phy may in fact not be. Again, such a game will turn out to
be child pornography on Rea’s account only if it is rea-
sonable to assume that it will be treated as pornography by
the game’s intended audience, where treating something as
pornography requires that one take a sexual interest in it.
However, as I suggested at the beginning of this section, I
think that the moral reasoning that Levy, and thereby
Bartel, offers here may be applicable to games that involve
virtual pedophilia regardless of their status as pornography.
This is so because such imagery, even if it is not pornog-
raphy in the strict sense, still sexualizes inequality and all
that is required to establish the moral claim that Bartel
needs to establish. Even stronger, consider that we can
make the same charge against all kinds of sexualized
imagery that we find in our greater cultures, advertising for
instance, and it is likely the case that non-pornographic
imagery of this kind is even more harmful because it is so
pervasive and culturally acceptable.10 If Bartel can estab-
lish this, then his argument can resolve the gamer’s
dilemma just as adequately as it could were he able to
establish thesis one. That is, if Levy’s argument goes
through, then Bartel’s attempt to resolve the gamer’s
dilemma is not dependent on making the case that such
games are pornography. It will be enough if they sexualize
inequality.
Still, I think that we should be cautious here. I do not
think that those of us who are interested in resolving the
gamer’s dilemma as it is posed by Luck will be entirely
satisfied with even this revised version of Bartel’s resolu-
tion. This is so because, rather than telling us what is
distinctively wrong with what I will from here on out call
virtual child sexual assault, Bartel points us in the direction
of an indirect harm, the harm that such images cause to
some other kind of entity, namely women. It is precisely
this move that makes Bartel’s resolution less than satisfy-
ing. Though I think that Levy may very well be right to
claim that virtual images that sexualize children harm
women because they sexualize inequality, those of us who
are interested in Luck’s version of the gamer’s dilemma
feel its pull because we think that there is something par-
ticularly egregious about it specifically because it involves
our virtually sexually assaulting children. Since, Bartel’s
analysis does not make essential reference to the role that
children play in our moral assessment, his resolution seems
to rely on the wrong kind of moral reason. If I am right,
then I think that we should conclude that the gamer’s
dilemma has not been adequately resolved by Bartel even
if it has technically been resolved because (1) premise one
is false, and (2) even though Bartel’s resolution does not
necessarily depend on making the case for thesis one, the
moral resources that Bartel relies on to support thesis two
are too far from the core case to offer a convincing, and full
resolution. Simply put, even if there are resources available
internal to Bartel’s argument to gives us the right answer,
i.e., there is a morally significant and principled difference
between virtual murder and virtual child sexual assault, it
does not do so for the right kinds of reasons. As a result his
resolution should be unsatisfying.
9 It is worth pointing out that in a 2006 discussion paper entitled
‘‘Corporate Paedophilia: Sexualisation of Children in Australia,’’
Emma Rush and Andrea La Nauze argue that in Australia there is
growing evidence of the sexualization of children in the media,
particularly in advertising that is aimed at children. They conclude
that ‘‘children face a range of risks associated with their sexualisation.
These include: an increase in eating disorders at younger ages;
increasing body dissatisfaction; more extreme attention-getting sexual
behaviours; first sexual intercourse at younger ages; promotion of
paedophilia; the undermining of other aspects of their overall
development; and the absorption of ethical values that undermine
healthy relationships’’ (p. 47). It seems then that we may be
experiencing a shift in our cultural tolerance for the sexualization
of children, one that raises concerns about the effect that such a shift
will have on children. I do not doubt that children who consume such
images are likely harmed in the ways that Rush and La Nauze
identify, even though they recognize that we lack the necessary
empirical data to adequately support their worries. Still, I’m not
convinced that this study can be used to support a Levy-style
argument in relation to the kind of sexualized representations that are
the subject of this inquiry. Consider, for example, that the primary
subject of such sexualization is, unsurprisingly, girls. Also, the case
that Rush and La Nauze make is one wherein which children are
harmed because they are exposed to images that they consume.
However, the case that we consider here is one in which adults play a
game whose characters are representations of children, not one where
children are playing such a game. I have no doubt that we have strong
reasons, of the type cited by Rush and La Nauze, for keeping children
away from such games. But, in order for this data to support a Levy
type argument, it would have to be the case that such imagery plays a
part in the willingness of adults to oppress children, and I am not
convinced that we are there yet. I thank an anonymous reviewer for
pointing to me to this very interesting, and disheartening study.
10 Here think of advertisements for American Apparel, just about any
Maxim Magazine cover, Sports Illustrated’s Swimsuit Issue, Sun
Magazine’s page three girls, and Victoria’s Secret Catalog, just to
name a few. Readers are invited to think of cases internal to their own
culture.
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Are there direct moral reasons to avoid enjoying certain
games?
Might there be other, more direct, moral resources avail-
able to us? To help explore this issue further, let us con-
sider the following scenario: You find yourself at a party
where a group of individuals is playing a fictitious game
called Child Sexual Assault. Child Sexual Assault is played
much like the notorious Japanese game Rapelay with one
difference. In Child Sexual Assault, gamers are incentiv-
ized to virtually hunt down and sexually assault what
appear to be very young children, both male and female;
there is no depiction of a mother. For their part, the group
members do not seem to treat the video game as pornog-
raphy in the sense that Rea uses this term. That is, they do
not seem to be remotely turned on by the depictions.
Instead, they are laughing and joking, and most of them
seem to think that the fact that the game is hilarious pre-
cisely because it is so morally transgressive. A member of
the group turns to you and bids you to join them. Should
you refuse?
It is worth noting that the question ‘should you refuse?’
is an all-in one. That is, it is a question about what you
should do all-things-considered. In answering an all-in
question, because it is question about what is to be done
all-things-considered, must take considerations of all kinds
into account, both moral and non-moral. Since, my focus
here is only on moral considerations, let us set aside the all-
in question. Instead, let us focus on a narrower one:
are there direct moral resources that support our refusal?
This question is not about what we should do all-things-
considered, but about what kinds of reasons there are that
might go into an all-in judgment about what to do.
One consideration that may strike us as salient is an
extrinsic one, namely that playing this game in this context
will send the wrong moral message. Clearly, our behavior
can do this. For example, cheering on a bully sends the
signal to others that in certain situations bullying is called
for. Conversely, challenging someone’s attempt at bullying
on moral grounds sends a different moral signal, viz., that
bullying is not called for and that disrupting the activities
of bullies is what is called for. Given that our behaviors
have such moral impacts, we have a prima facie duty to
take such facts into consideration in deciding what to do.
Similarly, it is reasonable to think that our play behavior
can communicate moral messages to those who are privy to
such behavior. American football fans, for example, likely
communicate messages that glorify violence, when, for
example, they cheer at a big hit. Similarly, we might be
tempted to think that playing Child Sexual Assault in the
context described above runs the moral risk of sending the
signal that actual child sexual assault is fun or that it is
somehow a less serious moral concern than in fact it is.
Still, I think it is quite unlikely that our joining the game
would send signals like these. This is so because, as I
argued earlier, child sexual assault is so culturally taboo
that it is very unlikely that anyone would read our behavior
in this way. Perhaps if the group were treating the repre-
sentations as pornography we might have this worry, but
here we clearly do not. So, I see no obvious reason for
thinking that it is a legitimate worry.
It is worth noting that a worry about the moral signal
that our gameplay might send is a concern about the
potential harms to which our gameplay might contribute.
And, debates over the moral status of video games, video
game play, and video game development tend to focus
almost exclusively on making or undoing the case for the
harm that such games cause to gamers and those with
whom gamers interact.11 I think that there are several
reasons for this. First, harm has obvious moral salience.
That an action of mine harms others (or perhaps myself) is
a morally relevant consideration that only the most strident
moral skeptic would deny. Second, we might be tempted to
think that only harm has moral salience in video game
contexts. This is so because in these kinds of cases we are
dealing with highly fictionalized representations and highly
imaginative responses. So, we might think that the only
way that morality can gain traction in video game contexts
is if it can be shown that our engagement with them or their
production causes harm to gamers or others. But, if that is
true, then it begins to look as if Bartel’s indirect resolution
to the gamer’s dilemma is the best that we can do.
But, for at least some of us, finding out that playing
Child Sexual Assault for fun is unlikely to harm anyone
will not undermine the thought that there is still something
morally troubling about this game. What, if anything,
might ground such a judgment? I have argued elsewhere
that there are non-harm based moral resources that might
help us to think about morality in imaginative contexts like
video games (2011b), pornography (2013, forthcoming),
jokes (2011a), artworks (2008a, b), and even idle fantasies
(2008a). In general, I have argued that in specific cases the
representational imagery that we find in imaginative con-
texts both gains meaning and loses what we might call a
kind of interpretive flexibility. This limits our ability to
claim that ‘‘it is only a game’’ and makes the issue of how
we should respond to such imagery a cogent moral ques-
tion. In closing, I draw on this account to further develop it
in a way that might apply to Child Sexual Assault, and
consider what implications this might have for the gamer’s
dilemma.
11 Interestingly, the ethics of video games literature shares this
feature with debates over the moral and legal status of pornography.
Eaton (2007) calls the thought that any moral criticism of such
imagery must rely on making the case that such imagery harms actual
people ‘‘the harm hypothesis.’’
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Let us begin by considering the following scenario:
While watching television alone you come across a white
comedian who tells an obviously racist joke. For the sake
of simplicity of interpretation, let us further imagine that
you know that the comedian is in fact a racist so that you
are confident that his joke is intended to be a racially
demeaning one. Setting aside issues of harm to oneself or
others, are there moral reasons that count against our being
amused? I think that there are. In fact, if the joke is bad
enough we might conclude that we should not be amused at
all for moral reasons: that the aim of the joke is to mock or
humiliate those of African descent simply because they are
of African descent, for example, might ground our judg-
ment that we should not find the joke funny. I do not mean
to suggest that we should never be amused at jokes with
immoral content; I think that we will likely have to make
such a determination on a case by case basis. However, it is
a common enough thought that there are at least some jokes
that we should not find funny because their representational
content is racially demeaning. This phenomenon suggests
that there may be moral reasons to avoid responding pos-
itively to at least some putatively imaginative representa-
tions that do not rely on making the case for the harm of
such responses.
How might an appeal to similar kinds of reasons help us
in the case of Child Sexual Assault? One noteworthy fea-
ture of Child Sexual Assault is that it invites us to virtually
sexually assault a child. Even stronger, it seems that the
game invites us to sexually assault a character because it is
a child. For some gamers, myself included, this feature of
the representation will call to mind actual child sexual
assault in a way that undermines or even blocks what might
otherwise be the imaginative character of the game: We
will be unable to enjoy the game because of a relationship
that we see between this game and actual victims of child
sexual assault. Since, actual victims of child sexual assault
are similarly targeted because they are children. It is in
light of this relationship that we see the game as a reflec-
tion of, rather than a departure from, our actual moral
reality. To the extent that we experience the game in this
way, as in some sense a reflection of our shared moral
reality, we will refuse to find the game amusing (or at least
find it more difficult to find it amusing) for precisely the
same reasons that we should refuse to find actual child
sexual assault amusing. Such events are not enjoyable they
are morally horrifying.
The view that I have sketched thus far might appear to be
wholly descriptive. Gamers who in fact see the representa-
tion of child sexual assault as a representation of reality will
also tend to see it as the kind of thing that should not be
enjoyed. Still, it is worth considering the extent to which
there is a normative relationship between interpreting rep-
resentational content in a particular way, and which, if any,
responses are legitimated or ruled out in light of our inter-
pretation. For example, it seems that the gamer who cannot
help but see Child Sexual Assault as a reflection of or
extension of our moral reality should be unable to find this
content enjoyable (or, again, should find it very difficult to do
so). This is so because the object of her amusement is a
different object altogether from the object as interpreted by
the gamer who sees it only as a bit of harmless fun. The
objects are interpreted quite differently and as a result the
instances of amusement involved have different intentional
objects. Further, the reason that the gamer who sees the game
as a reflection of reality should fail to be amused by it will be
roughly the same kind reason that she should fail to be
amused by the representational content of a photograph of
child sexual assault.
So far, all I have shown is that if interpreting the game
as a reflection of our moral reality is reasonable, then it
seems our affective response, e.g., our refusal to be
entertained, to be amused, or to enjoy the representational
content, is also reasonable. The argumentative burden then
falls on our ability to show that such an interpretation is, in
this particular case, reasonable. How might we make a case
for the reasonableness of this kind of interpretation of
putatively imaginative representational content? While I do
not have space to develop the account fully here, we might
begin by looking at cross-sphere similarities that are
interpretively relevant and morally salient. As I said earlier,
the fact that in the game children are virtually sexually
targeted because they are children seems relevant here.
How so? In part, the answer lies in the fact that it matches
the real world in which children are often the targets of
sexual violence because they are children. It is the fact that
we are invited to target characters in this particular way, I
think, that serves as a ground for our interpretation here.
The video game invites us to target a virtual character by
morally irrelevant criteria that are the very morally irrele-
vant criteria in virtue of which actual individuals are tar-
geted, demeaned, harmed and/or oppressed in the actual
world. If I am right, then it is features like this that make it
at least reasonable to see responses such as amusement,
enjoyment, or other forms of what we might call enter-
tainment morally inappropriate responses to the represen-
tational object as interpreted. I am not saying that for any
given representational object we should ask ourselves
‘‘would our response be fitting were the object actual?’’
What I am saying is that some kinds of representational
details may begin to make it more reasonable to see the
in-game activities as reflecting our moral reality rather than
departing from it. The same analysis, I think, can be
applied to the racist joke. Part of what makes the joke
morally worrisome is that it appears to be a reflection of
our lived moral reality that includes substantive and wide-
spread instances of racial injustice, injustice which is
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supported in part by racially demeaning jokes. The joke,
like the video game, asks us to target a virtual character by
morally irrelevant criteria which are the very same morally
irrelevant criteria that actual individuals are targeted,
demeaned, harmed and/or oppressed in the actual world.
Though I think that we can make an even stronger case in
the instance of racist jokes, and similarly racist video
games than we can for video games that invite acts of child
sexual assault, I think that the account that have sketched
here is at least getting close to what explains the moral
responses of those who find Child Sexual Assault morally
disturbing independent of the harm that enjoying such a
game might cause.
Assuming that view that I have begun to sketch here can
ultimately be sustained, and in the case of Child Sexual
Assault there is quite a bit more work to be done to show
that such responses are reasonable, there is still yet more
work to be done. I think that those who see the game as a
reflection of reality are likely to conceive of those who are
capable of enjoying such representational content as at the
very least morally distasteful and/or morally immature. In
order to make this move plausible, we will have to show
not only that the interpretation is reasonable but that it is
called for. Here again, I think that such a case is more
easily made for the racist representational content of the
joke than it is for the pedophilic content. If such a case can
be made for Child Sexual Assault, then I think that it will
begin as I have begun it here and continue to show that
something about the nature of actual act of child sexual
assault makes it more difficult morally to see even virtual
representations of it as enjoyable. I further suspect that if
such an account can be sustained, it will appeal to facts
about the relative helplessness of the victims of such actual
wrongs, though, again, I have not made such an argument
here. I suspect that disagreement between gamers who see
such content as a bit of harmless fun, and those who see it
as morally troubling will debate these very issues.
Still, assuming that we can make the weaker case, i.e., it
is reasonable to interpret Child Sexual Assault as more of a
reflection or extension of reality than a departure from it,
what implications might this have for the gamer’s
dilemma? What does this account commit us to in the case
of run-of-the-mill first person shooters? We might think
that since killing is at least as morally bad as sexually
assaulting someone, even a child, and so whatever we say
about Child Sexual Assault, we will have to say about Red
Dead Redemption and the like. But, I think that we are in a
position now to see that this move relies on a mistaken
moral assumption, namely that if our virtual activities are
subject to non-harm based moral assessment then they
must derive their moral status in a straight-forward way
from the status that they would have in the real world. If
what I have said thus far is plausible, then what matters
morally in video game contexts is the nature of represen-
tational detail that we confront in-game and how reason-
ably it invokes thoughts of our actual moral reality. So,
what is key here is seeing that in the case of a run-of-the-
mill first person shooter, we are not targeting individuals in
the same way that we are in Child Sexual Assault, though
we could. For example, a game might invite us to virtually
hunt down and lynch characters that appear to be of Afri-
can descent. A game like this does possess representational
details that make it more reasonable to see it as a reflection
of our lived moral reality and less like a bit of ‘‘harmless
fun.’’ But, in what I am calling run-of-the-mill first person
shooters, characters are not targeted in this kind of way,
which makes it more reasonable to see run-of-the-mill first
person shooters as a departure from rather than a reflection
of real world moral concerns. So, it seems that if this
analysis can ultimately be maintained, we can begin to
draw a principled distinction between virtual acts of child
sexual assault and run-of-the-mill virtual acts of murder. I
say ‘run-of-the-mill’ here, because on this view not all acts
of virtual murder will get a moral pass. Since, as I argued
previously, virtual murder too can be presented in such a
way that reasonably connects it to our moral reality, it
might also be subject to moral criticism. This, I think,
counts in favor of this line of reasoning rather than against
it as I think that it gives us the right answer in the case of
the lynching game. Further, the reasoning that I offer here
is direct in a way that Bartel’s and Levy’s is not. It makes
essential reference to role that the fact that the object of our
enjoyment is the virtual sexual assault of children plays in
our moral judgments. Though I have not fully made the
case here, what I hope to have shown is that issues of the
moral appropriateness of our responses to the representa-
tional content that we find in video games and the con-
nection it has to our moral interpretation of this content is a
fruitful line of philosophical investigation that may provide
a more adequate resolution to the gamer’s dilemma.
Conclusion
Here I have argued that Christoper Bartel is mistaken to
think that he can rely on Michael Rea’s definition of
‘pornography’ to support his claim that virtual pedophilia
is child pornography. This is so because on Rea’s view
something is pornography if and only if it is reasonable to
believe that it will be treated as pornography by its inten-
ded audience. To the extent that it is reasonable to believe
that video games that contain virtual pedophilic content
will not be played primarily because their audiences
desires to be sexually aroused by the representational
content in question, they are not pornography. Perhaps
some instances will so count, but certainly we cannot look
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to Rea to support the kind of general claim advocated by
Bartel. Maybe we can return to the task of definition to help
us here, but barring some minor worries that I have about
condition four on treating something as pornography,
namely the counter-factual desire constraint (2013, forth-
coming), I think that Rea’s account is the best one on offer.
Still, I argued, even if such a claim cannot ultimately be
substantiated, this need not worry Bartel since the moral
resources that he relies on, Levy’s account of the moral
wrongness of child pornography, applies equally well to
representations that are merely pornographic. Further, I
argued that while this line of argument may in fact provide
us a moral reason for avoiding games with such content, it
does not adequately resolve Luck’s version of the gamer’s
dilemma. What we want is to know what is wrong with
virtual child pornography, or virtual enactments of child
sexual assault. If I am right, then we should look elsewhere
for a resolution to the gamer’s dilemma than to the kinds of
indirect harm that such imagery might bring. Finally, I
have suggested alternate moral resources for resolving the
gamer’s dilemma which do not rely on making the case that
virtual pedophilia is child pornography and which are
direct in a way that Bartel’s resources are not.
References
Bartel, C. (2012). Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. Ethics and
Information Technology, 14(1), 11–16.
Black, M. C., Basile, K. C., Breiding, M. J., Smith, S. G., Walters, M. L.,
Merrick, M. T., Chen, J., & Stevens, M. R. (2011). The National
Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS): 2010
Summary Report. Atlanta, GA: National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion. http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nisvs/. Accessed
September 25, 2012.
Eaton, A. W. (2007). A sensible anti-porn feminism. Ethics, 117,
674–715.
Finkelhor, D., Hammer, H., & Sedlak, A. J. (2008). Sexually
assaulted children: National estimates and characteristics.
National incidence studies of missing, abducted, runaway, and
thrown away children. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/
214383.pdf. Accessed September 25, 2012.
La Nauze, A., & Rush, E. (2006). Corporate paedophilia: Sexualisation
of children in Australia. http://www.ncwnz.org.nz/assets/Action/
Corporate-Paedophilia.pdf. Accessed December 29, 2012.
Levinson, J. (2005). Erotic art and pornographic pictures. Philosophy
and Literature, 29(1), 228–240.
Levy, N. (2002). Virtual child pornography: The eroticization of
inequality. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(4), 319–323.
Luck, M. (2009). The gamer’s dilemma: An analysis of the arguments
for the moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual
paedophilia. Ethics and Information Technology, 11(1), 31–36.
Mag Uidhir, C. (2009). Why pornography can’t be art. Philosophy
and Literature, 33(10), 193–203.
Patridge, S. (2008a). Monstrous thoughts and the moral identity
thesis. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 36(2), 181–193.
Patridge, S. (2008b). Moral vices and artistic virtues: Eugene onegin
and alice. Philosophia, 42(2), 187–201.
Patridge, S. (2011a). Against the moralistic fallacy: A modest
proposal for a modest sentimentalism about humor. Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice, 15(1), 83–94.
Patridge, S. (2011b). The incorrigible social meaning of video games
imagery: Making ethical sense of single-player video games.
Ethics and Information Technology, 14(4), 303–312.
Patridge, S. (2013, forthcoming). Exclusivism and evaluation: Art,
erotica, and pornography. In: H. Maes (Ed.), Pornographic
art and the aesthetics of pornography. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Rea, M. C. (2001). What is pornography? Nouˆs, 35(1), 118–145.
34 S. L. Patridge
123
